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Abstract. A classical, Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test results in a decision (choice of action) justified
not by any assessment of sample evidence, but by the pre-specified frequencies with which that
procedure generates errors of the two possible types. By applying such a test in auditing, the
hypothesis tested is accepted or rejected without the auditor having to consider whether the data
observed confirms (in any degree), or disconfirms, that hypothesis. In contrast with the classical
framework, the Bayesian approach is to evaluate the probability of the hypothesis tested conditional on
the data observed, and then to make a decision on the basis of that revised probability. Decisions are
thus evidence-based rather than rule-based. So as to compare the classical and Bayesian programs, a
familiar test example is considered, and hypothetical data, which, on a classical view, marginally reject
the auditee's stated account balance, are re-interpreted from a Bayesian, evidential perspective. The
results of this comparison reveal that classical hypothesis tests in auditing do not have a consistent
(from test-to-test) evidential basis, and, in Bayesian terms, are therefore "incoherent". Also, contrary to
intuitive expectations, marginal rejection is found to imply evidence in favor of the auditee's stated
balance. Asymptotically, an account balance which is rejected only marginally in a classical hypothesis
test has an "objective" (not-dependent-on-prior) posterior probability arbitrarily close to one.
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1.

Introduction

This paper contrasts the classical, Neyman-Pearson logic of hypothesis testing
with the Bayesian program for statistical inference and decision making. Unlike
previous studies in auditing comparing classical and Bayesian statistical
methodology, primary consideration is given to foundational, philosophical
and logical issues underlying the distinction and longstanding conflict
between classical and Bayesian statistics. In particular, the question is asked
of the result of a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test, "What does it mean?", or
more specifically, "What is the evidence so represented?". Comparison of the
classical and Bayesian responses to this fundamental question reveals aspects
of the classical paradigm which, to a Bayesian, are logically indefensible.

Comparative study of the foundations of classical and Bayesian statistical
methodologies is anticipated in a chapter by Akresh et al. (1988) on "Audit
Approaches and Techniques", in the American Accounting Assoclotlon's
agenda of Research Opportunities in Auditing.

Amoung the identified

research issues relating to audit sampling and decision theory is the following:
What are the properties/advantages/disadvantages of Bayesian decisiontheoretic models in auditing as compared to classical statistical models? Given
that the goal is to improve audit decision making, how do these approaches
compare in terms of sample sizes, defensibility, ability to aggregate with other
souces of evidence. etc.? (p.50)

Each of the specifics mentioned in this passage, viz. the matters of sample size,
evidence aggregation, and in particular the logical defensibility of classical
decision theory in comparison with the Bayesian alternative, comes into focus
once the evidential content of classical test results is questioned in the
fundamental manner described above.

Previous research in auditing contrasting orthodox (Le. "classical") and
Bayesian statistical methods is mostly concerned with 'proctlcot" or technical
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matters - for example, there is a rich body of work correlating the frequentist
coverage probabilities of Bayesian and classical confidence bounds in money
unit sampling (e.g., Tsui et al. (1985), Dworin and Grimlund (1986), Smielianskas
(1986) and Grimlund and Felix (1987)). While such cross-validation is of obvious
theoretical and practical importance, many of the more foundational issues
separating the classical and Bayesian formalisms have been given relatively
little attention in the statistics-in-auditing literature, at least by comparison with
the profile and history of philosophical debate in the disciplines of
mathematical statistics and the philosophy of science.

There is sometimes the supposition in auditing that although practitioners
employing classical statistical methods, including hypothesis tests, are formally
commited to orthodox statistical concepts and terminology, they retain the
status of "informal" or de facto Bayesians.

Unfortunately, this ecumanical

standpoint is generally untenable, as has been known to Bayesians since
Jeffreys (1961, pp.359-60; 1st ed. 1939). More recently, following much related
Bayesian criticism of the orthodox or classical paradigm (e.g., de Finetti (1975),
Edwards et 01. (1963); Good (1981), (1983); Lindley (1957), (1972); Pratt (1965)
and Zellner (1971), (1984)), articles by Berger and Sellke (1987, p.136) and
Berger and Delampady (1987, p.330) published in the Journal of the American
Statistical Association and Statistical Science (also an ASA journal), and
commended by various eminent discussants, conclude with the view that the
results of classical hypothesis tests are so commonly and systematically
disparate with Bayesian probability revision that the future of such tests in
statistics is highly questionable. The mathematical theory of statistical sampling
in auditing is very well developed, even by the standards of statistics proper,
however the substance and severity of authorative Bayesian dissatisfaction
with Neyman-Pearson methods, as seen in papers such as those cited above,
is not similarly well represented in the applied literature in auditing.
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To preclude unnecessary technical difficulty, the analysis below begins with
consideration of the most well known of Neyman-Pearson hypothesis tests
employed in auditing, that of the mean of a normal population. This is one of
the tests by which Neyman and Pearson (1933, pp.153-6) exposited their logic
of statistical hypothesis testing,

and through which most students are

introduced to the application of that theory in ouditlnq. More importantly, the
test of a normal mean, although technically straightforward, embodies all the
paradigmatic characteristics of Neyman-Pearson logic and philosophy, and is
therefore an appropriate starting point when the foundations of that paradigm
are in question.

Indeed, by avoiding the added distractions of tests which

involve more difficult, or less familiar, applications of the same underlying logic,
attention is restricted to issues of principle affecting all Neyman-Pearson
hypothesis tests, regardless of technical idiosyncracy.

2.

An Example Test

Assume a population X-N(e,(j2) of individual accounts (e.g., receivables) with
unknown mean

e,

and variance

0'2.

To decide between the actions of

accepting and rejecting the auditee's aggregate account balance, an
auditor conducts a statistical hypothesis test of

Ho: [B l5:m
where

versus

Hj : I e I »rri

e represents the population average error (Le., the average of the errors

in the auditee's accounts receivable) and m denotes the average error
amount deemed material (intolerable) by the auditor. Following a textbookstandard procedure (e.g., Roberts (1978) p.45; Arens and Loebbecke (1981)
pp.137-44; (1991) p.520), the auditor's decision rule is to accept Ho, and thus
the auditee's stated balance, only if the two-sided 100(1-P)% confidence
interval estimated for

e

lies entirely within the predetermined materiality
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bounds [-m,m].

Otherwise the stated balance is rejected. The effect of this

decision rule is to set the minimum power of the test against H]: /8 I »rti.

min
lel>m

p(Reject Ho I 8),

greater than 100(1-P/2)%. Having this power characteristic, the test described
fits the definition of Duke et al. (1982, p.51) of a IInegative" test.

Example Results.

For the purpose of exposition assume known a=170, and

suppose the auditor tests

observing a sample mean X with n observations, where n is fixed before any
data have been drawn or inspected.

The classical two-sided 100(1-P)%

confidence interval for 8, the population mean, is X ±z~/2aNn (disregarding
finite population correction). For P=0.05,

Z~I2= 1.96,

etc. The rejection level, or

"crltlcol" value of the test statistic, henceforth denoted by Xc' is

m-z~l2aNn.

A result X =X c marginally rejects Ho since the right-hand confidence limit,

X c+z~/2aNn, equals exactly the materiality limit tri' Letting P=0.05, consider the
following three such results and their associated 95% confidence intervals:

~

[-74.012, 75]

(n=50, X =27.8784)

~

[-19.243, 75]

(n=90, X =39.8776)

~

[4.755, 75].

(n=20, X =0.4942)

For an auditor having observed one of these results, the problem is one of
interpretation. Specifically, of what logical meaning or use is that observation?
This question, which might arise in negotiation with a client or in defence of
the auditor's decision process in a court, is answered below, first from a
classical frequentist-decision-theoretic perspective, and then from the less
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conventional, Bayesian standpoint.

Contrary to what seems a "common

sense" understanding of classical hypothesis tests, marginal rejection of Ho is
found to confirm, rather than disconfirm, that hypothesis.

Indeed with

sufficiently large n. the probability of hypothesis Ho conditioned on data
marginally rejecting Ho is close to one, whatever the assumed prior.

3.

Classical Interpretation

Each of the supposed results leads the auditor to formally "reject" Ho and thus
to take accordant action, possibilities including marginal adjustment of the
oudltee's stated balance (Arens and Loebbecke (1981) pp.149-50) and, in the
other extreme, qualification of the audited accounts (Kinney (1975) p.119).
The "orflclol" Neyman-Pearson rationale underlying this orthodox interpretation
is that by acting strictly in accord with a predesignated decision rule, in one
test after another, the frequencies of errors of types I and II built into that rule
will almost certainly be achieved (approximately) over the long-run of
applications.

For instance, if the minimum power

(1-"~

risk") of a test

procedure is 97.5%, then account balances will be accepted in no more than
2.5% of those test repetitions in which the stated balance is in fact materially
incorrect.

Note the order of the conditionality here - specifically the figure

2.5% represents the maximum probability of an acceptance given an
incorrect balance, not the maximum probability of an incorrect balance given
an acceptance. The former of these two probabilities is sometimes translated
mistakenly as the latter (cf. de Finetti (1975) p.248).
Ignoring assumptions (e.g., normality), actual error frequencies close to their
theoretical or nominal values are "guaranteed" by the law of large numbers,
provided, of course, that the practitioner complies in each test with the
decision rule established before the test was run. No allowance may be made
for the possibly narrow margin by which a particular result rejects or accepts
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Ho, or for any counteNailing factor such as an apparently "unlucky".
unrepresentative or biased-looking random sample.

If by occasionally and

subjectively setting aside a decision rule stipulated before seeing the data e.g., by treating a IIjust-overll rejection of Ho as an acceptance, or by
discounting an unstratified sample which, albeit drawn at random, has the
appearance of being unrepresentative or "blosed''

2 -

the auditor introduces

personal judgement and possible statistical bias, the nominal error frequencies
attached to that decision rule no longer have the same objective meaning or
relevance (cf. Kyburg (1974, p.221); Roberts (1978, p.43)).

The 'true" error

frequencies of such a discretionary procedure are indeterminate, and may be
better or worse than their nominal values.

It is this latter possibility which

underlies the joint tenets in frequentist (l.e.. classical) statistics of predesignation
and "no looking back".

4.

Why a Bayesian Interpretation?

The orthodox or classical approach leads to a decision (choice of action)
based not on an assessment of evidence contained within the data, but on
the long-run average error frequencies (lloperating characteristics") of the test
procedure (decision rule) by which that choice is made:
Neyman's school. followed strictly, maintains that there is no such thing as
inconclusive evidence for hypotheses. We can only make decisions about
hypotheses, following some pattern of decision-making with desirable
characteristics. When we decide for an hypothesis, we do not do so because the
evidence makes it credible. (Hacking (1973) p.490).

This instrumentalist philosophy is most clearly evident in Neyman's instruction on
the interpretation of confidence lntervols:
/\

/\

The specific interval s-c < e< S+C, calculated for a confidence coefficient a,
selected by the statistician to suit his purposes, gives an unambiguous answer: act
on the assumption that the unknown e lies between the limits indicated. If the
consumer asks why he should do so, the answer is: if you behave that way, you will
be right (approximately) in 100a per cent of cases. (Neyman (1971) p.80).
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By comparison, the Bayesian approach is to think of

a hypothesis test not as

one of a long and perhaps hypothetical (imaginary) sequence, but as a

e;

logical procedure by which to gain information about the parameter

and

hence to support with evidence a decision either to accept or reject the
auditee's stated balance.

Interpreted this way, hypothesis tests provide for

both inference and decision.
distribution of

Data X are gathered and the probability

e conditional on that data,

permits inferences concerning

e in

pee I X), is calculated. This distribution

the form, for example, of 95% "c redible

mtervols" (the Bayesian correspondent of orthodox confidence lntervols).

Decisions might then ensue on the basis of pee I X), in conjunction with relevant
loss functions, according to the criterion of minimum expected loss.
In basing decisions on a logical evaluation of evidence,

pce I X), rather than

on the hypothetical error frequencies of a test mechanism which might not be
used again, the Bayesian paradigm is a model for what auditors purport to do.
This apparent congruence between Bayesian methods and the audit process
is well recognized (e.g" Beck et al. (1985), Kinney (1975) and Scott (1973;
1975)), but in practice, orthodox (non-Bayesian) statistical methods remain
more generally accepted. Part of the reason for this is that Bayesian methods
come to a posterior distribution for
pee I X)

oc

e,

pee I X), by way of Bayes' theorem, l.e..

pee) p(X I e), thus requiring a prior probability distribution for

e,

pee).

Prior distributions are seen by many as generally subjective (personal), and
therefore of doubtful standing within the ideally "scientific" audit process.
This same argument is cited often by researchers in the social sciences when
explaining why Bayesian methods have not been given greater application in
published empirical research.

It is widely conceded, however, that in

applications where an "objective" (Le., empirical, or deduced from theory)
prior distribution is available, Bayesian methods should be employed (Kyburg
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(1974) p.58). This concession traces to Neyman (e.g., 1957, p.19) and Fisher
(e.g., 1973, p.17) who together convinced earlier generations of statistical
theorists and applied statisticians of the general virtue, for the purposes of
scientific inquiry, of eschewing altogether the methods of inverse probability
(Bayesian statistics).
Rather than arguing the legitimacy of the subjectivist approach, or the
associated argument that objectivist statistics are an illusion - their subjective
aspects are merely "swept under the carpet" (cf. Good (1976), (1981, p.149);
Barnett (1975, p.19); Savage (1961, pp.178, 183); (1962, p.53) - this paper takes
the position that since Bayesian reasoning is considered the logical ideal, the
auditor's intuitive interpretation of statistical results should be aided by a type
of "what if" analysis, whereby posterior probabilities are found for Ho assuming
one possible prior and then another, covering as broad a range of possibilities
as necessary or desired.

By exploring the logical connotations of the data

from various possible perspectives or starting points (priors), the auditor can
develop intuitive "feel" for the direction and strength of evidence represented,
and learn by experience which factors determine these evidential qualities,
and the ways in which such relevant factors work and interact.
With some data sets it is found that the class of prior distributions under which
a certain inference - e.g., PCHa I X) > p(Ho> - remains valid, is so wide as to
include practically all those which could possibly be considered reasonable
(Edwards et al. (1963) pp.20l, 210-11). That is, to come to any other conclusion
one would have to manufacture a highly "personal" distribution of prior
probability, which, apart from producing the desired posterior, would have no
cause for being considered. In these circumstances of "practical objectivity"
(inter-subjectivity), where the data tends to dominate or "swamp" the prior,
any attempt to justify a rival inference would be hard pressed. To do so would
involve, implicitly, either a perverse appeal to a tailor made and clearly
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inappropriate prior, or, alternatively, the abandonment of Bayes' theorem and
of the fundamental probability axiom from which this theorem is deduced
(Le., the multiplication law).
By opting not to apply Bayesian methods, auditors and other practitioners
pass up experience in inductive inferential reasoning which would extend and
refine their abilities to assess evidence intuitively. As with deductive reasoning
(e.g., mathematics), training and experience can greatly enhance human
inductive inferential capabilities, particularly since it is known that in some
situations data has an "oblectlve" Bayesian interpretation quite disparate, at
least in degree, from that usually attributed to it on the methods of analysis
and principles of classical statistics (see, e.g., Edwards et al. (1963) pp.221, 225;
Berger and Sellke (1987) pp.135-6, 138 and Berger and Delampady (1987)
p.318). The results provided below represent a straightforward instance of this
sometimes diametric disparity between Bayesian inference and conventional
statistical practice.

4.

Bayesian Interpretation

In this section posterior probabilities of Ho are calculated, based on the three
observations (marginal rejections of Ho) supposed in Section 2, and assuming
various prior distributions for 8.
distributions are presumed.

For mathematical simplicity, normal prior
This allows the use of standard Bayesian

calculations for the normal mean (see below). The results described are not,
however, dependent on priors of this parametric family.

Rather, it is the

general location and relative concentration of prior mass which affects results,
not the particular mathematical or parametric "shope" of that distribution.
Priors (i) and (ii).

The first two priors considered have mean f.l=0, prior (i) with

variance y2= 1002 and prior (ii) with variance y2=5000 2.

For graphical
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representation of these distributions, see Figure 6 (in appendix). Prior (i) is quite
lIinformative" (low variance), at least compared with (ii) which is highly diffuse
or "unlntorrnotlve",

Both (i) and (ii) indicate that the auditor's expected

average population error is zero, however (i) implies far greater confidence in
8 close to zero than does (ii).

Distribution (ii) is very close to uniform and

represents extremely vague prior knowledge about 8, thus implying little
confidence in 8 close to zero, or in any other particular narrow interval of the
parameter space. Results of calculations for all priors, inclUding (i) and (ii), are
provided in Table 1. The formulae (1) and (2) with which these Bayesian results
are calculated are provided below.

Table 7 about here

Note from this table that both for priors (i) and (ii) the posterior probabilities of
Ho' p(Ho I X d' are all very high and much greater than their respective priors,
p(Ho), meaning that in each case Ho is strongly confirmed.

It is inferred,

therefore, given anyone of the supposed results, that the account balance
tested is in fact supported rather than 'rejected", This would be the logical
conclusion of one who begins with a prior which either: (i) gives appreciable
probability to 8 in the null (immaterial) interval [-m,m] relative to alternative
8 values, or (ii) is quite diffuse, and therefore lets the data, in a sense, "speok for
ltselt",

Priors (iii) and (iv).

For diffuse priors like (ii), the posterior probability of Ho is

highly insensitive to the prior mean (location) u. To demonstrate this, results are
calculated for priors with the same high variance v 2=50002 as prior (ii) but with
means greatly different from zero. Note that for each of the three supposed
marginal rejections Xc' PCHo I X J remains very high, despite PCHo) being very
low, suggesting, as for priors (i) and (ll). that Ho is strongly supported.

..

•
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How Marginal Rejection Supports Ho. How is it that an observed sample mean

which rejects Ho (the auditee's balance) in a classical hypothesis test can
actually greatly increase the Bayesian probability of that hypothesis?

The

answer to this question lies in the inherent conservativism of the "negative" type
of hypothesis test, for which minimum power against I e I »tn is 0.975 or some
similarly high figure. To institute such a high probability of rejecting Ho when

e is

barely material, the "critical" value of the sample mean, Xc' must be set at
~Z~/2(J/--Jn, which is clearly within the null (immaterial) interval [-m,m]=[-75,75],

even with large n. This means that marginal rejection of Ho occurs when the
observed X is inside [-m,m], which, of course, tends to support

e values

in that

null interval relative to alternative (material) values of the parameter.
Priors (v) and (vi).

We now consider priors appropriate when the auditor is

confident of an average error size. greater than m. Prior (v) has mean f.l=90
and variance y2= 152, and (vi) has f.l= 120 and y2=252. Both (v) and (vi) are
informative rather than vague priors, (vi) indicating a higher expected
average error than (v), but less confidence in

e about

its expected value.

Figure 6 (in appendix) depicts these distributions. It is found with both priors, (v)
and (vi), that marginal rejection increases the probability of the "rejected"
hypothesis - i.e., p(Ho I X J>p(Ho) - the more so the larger the sample size n
(indeed if

f3 is held at 0.05, then for

n= 1000, p(Ho I X J is about 0.94 for both (v)

and (vi)).
Priors (vii) and (viii).

The final class of priors considered allows for the unusual

situation where the auditor is confident of a negative material error
(understatement) in the auditee's stated balance.

The priors used are the

same as (v) and (vi) but with negative rather than positive means. With both
priors (vii) and (viii), p(HoI X J is high, even with n as low as 30. This is because
the combination of prior mass to the left of the null interval, [-m, m], and an
observed mean, Xc' towards the right of this interval, leads to a posterior
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distribution concentrated, between the two, mostly within [-m,m].

This is

particularly so for large n as the weight of sample information pulls the prior
mass more and more within the null interval.
Value of p(Ho I X c) with large n. Given a normal population X-N(a,(J2) and a

conjugate, normal prior distribution a-N(Il,y2), the posterior distribution of

a,

based on an observed sample mean X, is normal with mean
(1)

and variance
(2)

These standard Bayesian results (e.g., DeGroot (1986) pp.324-6) are the basis
for the calculations tabulated above.

It follows from (1) that with large enough n the posterior distribution for

a will

have a mean close to the sample mean X. Similarly, the value of (2), the
posterior variance, which can be written (1/y2+n/(J2yl, will be approximately
(J2/ n. particularly with large prior variance y2. Using these approximations, the
posterior probability of Ha: I a I::; m given a result X=Xc : PCHa I X d' is, for large n,
given by

pc-m::; a::; X c+z~/2(JNn I X d

=

p(a::; X c+z~l2crrv n I

=

4>(Z~/2) -

xd - p(a< -m I X J

<1>(-{m+X J"n/(J)

_ 4>(Z~I2) since <I>(-{m+XJ...Jn/cr) =0,

_

1-~/2,

where 4>(.) is the standard normal curnulotlve distribution function (e.g..
<1>(-1.64)=0.05, etc.). It is seen from this result that for a two-sided hypothesis test

L
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with minimum power against H1: I 8 I »m of 100(1-P/2)%=97 .5%, p(Ho I X J will, for
sufficiently large n. equal 1-P/2=0.975 (approximately), whatever the prior.
With a uniform prior, the posterior is 1-P/2 for any n.
With informative (Le., low v2) priors favoring 8E [-m,m], such as (I), p(Ho I X J
may actually be higher than 1-P/2 for small n (see Table 1), but as n increases
the information about 8 represented in the prior becomes relatively less and
less and the posterior probability of Ho approaches 1-J312, the value it would
have for a uniform or uninformative prior. The same is true of priors with a spike
at 8=0, as proposed by Edwards (1994) in comments on this paper.
The protocol of classical hypothesis tests requires that as n increases the more
important error probability is allowed to fall from its preset level (e.g., 0.05 or
0.01) toward zero, thereby maintaining parity (Le., an optimal trade-off)
between the two error probabilities, or at least preventing the less important
error probability from becoming the lower of the two (e.g., Cox and Hinkley
(1974) pp.397-8; Kendall and Stuart (1979) p.197; Lehmann (1986) p.125).3
Following this fundamental methodological requirement, the auditor must
have P---70 as n---7

00 ,

the type II ('beta") error being regarded as the more

important to avoid. Consequently,
lim

n-7 00

and thus, for large enough

p(HoI Xc) == 1-P/2 ---7 1,

n. Ho is rejected by a result Xc when, whatever the

prior, its Bayesian posterior probability is arbitrarily close to one.
This is similar to, but not the same as, "Lindley's paradox", examples of which,
usually applying to point (8=80) rather than interval

(81~8~82)

null hypotheses,

are well known in stotlstlcs." Johnstone (1990) provides references on this
paradox and example calculations. See also Berger and Mortera (1991) and
Johnstone and Lindley (1993), and in accounting literature, Christie (1990,
p.80). Contrary to what is found above, it has been considered previously that
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classical tests of interval null hypotheses are immune to problems of the like of
Lindley's paradox (e.g., Casella and Berger (1987) p.133).
For one hoping to avoid any qualitative inconsistency between the classical
and Bayesian interpretations of a result X=X c : it is possible to engineer a prior
distribution so as to inhibit or at least delay p(Ho I X J increasing with n. This can
be achieved by putting a "splke" of prior probability at

e marginally

greater

than m. but any such prior distribution would be obviously forced and
unacceptable.

For more reasonable priors, p(Ho I X J tends to increase

smoothly and rapidly as n increases.

The intuitive reason for this is that the

greater n, the greater the support offered by the sample for
mean, Xc E [-m, m].

e equal to its own

Inevitably this volume of data will "swornp" relatively

informative prior distributions like (v) and (vi), and so too even the most
tendentious prior such as one with a spike at e=m+o (0 small).

5.

Apparent Incoherence

If p(Ho I X J is very high, perhaps close to one, whatever the (reasonable) prior,
a Bayesian auditor having observed X=X c may well accept Ho, and hence the
auditee's balance, without alteration or further inquiry. From a conventional
viewpoint, however, Ho is 'rejected" and some accordant action is necessary.
If this action is merely a marginal adjustment to the stated balance, so as to
bring it into the formal acceptance region of the test, then the practical cost
and inconvenience to either auditor or auditee may not be much.

Other

possible responses, particularly that of adjusting the auditee's stated account
balance to its point estimate, or perhaps some qualification of the accounts,
will usually be of greater consequence.
The auditor's problem in these circumstances is not necessarily one of
significant needless costs, but of justifying a decision procedure which formally
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"rejects" a balance with high probability of being materially correct. and yet in
other, smaller tests, "accepts" balances which, subjectively at least. have
appreciably lower probabilities of being correct in this sense.

Consider, for

example, the further. possible result (n=30, X = 14.1), which yields a 95%
confidence interval for 8, [-46.734,74.934], lying wholly, albeit marginally, within
[-m,m]=[-75,75], and therefore leads the auditor to accept Ho.

Posterior

probabilities of Ho based on this assumed result are compared in Table 2 with
those given marginal rejection of Ho in the test with sample size n=90.

Table 2 about here

Depending on the prior used, p(Ho I X) is either the same (approximately) or
lower for the (n=30, X = 14.1) marginal acceptance of Ho as for the larger
sample result (n=90, X=X c=39.8776) which formally rejects Ho. Moreover, with
priors (v)-(viii), according to which the auditor needs some strong reassurance
before being persuaded from a contrary belief, the posterior probability that
the stated balance is materially correct is much higher on the larger (n=90) test
which rejects Ho than on the smaller (n=30) test which accepts that hypothesis.
Indeed, for the n=30 result, p(Ho I X) is only .481 given prior (v) or .432 with prior
(vi), Ho being accepted, whereas for the n=90 result. the minimum value of
p(Ho I X J across all priors (i)-(viii) is .688, and yet here Ho is rejected.

These

outcomes appear anomalous and indicate that an intuitive or "common
sense" evidential interpretation of conventional test results (e.g., "reject Ho"
implies strong evidence against Ho) can be very misleading.

6.

How Important is the Prior?

The paradoxical finding of Section 5, that the n=90 marginal rejection of Ho
implies at least the same weight of evidence in favor of that hypothesis as the

!

L

_
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n=30 acceptance, is highly insensitive to the choice of prior. and is, therefore,

quite "oblectlve", Consider the difference between posterior probabilities:
p(Ho I X=14.1, n=30) - p(Ho I X=X c=39,8776, n=90),

(3)

which is represented in Figures 1 and 2, in the forms of surface and contour
plots, as a function of prior parameters /l and v. The contour plot (Figure 2) is a
"topoprophicot mop" of the surface plot darker shades representing bigger
negative values of the difference defined by (3),

Figures 1 and 2 about here

The maximum value of (3) is only ,0018, this difference occuring with prior
parameters J..l=-5,04 and v=51 ,60, on which the posteriors are .9927 (n=30) and
,9909 (n=90). Apart from a class of normal priors with about this same mean /l,

all yielding posteriors near one for both the data, the difference defined by (3)
is negative, the posterior based on the n=90 rejection being the higher, and
clearly so for a large class of priors with v between about 15 and 65, It is seen,
therefore, at least for normal priors, that the posterior probability of Ho is either
practically the same, or higher, given the n=90 rejection as that conditioned
on the n=30 acceptance.
The robustness or "oblectlvltv" of this finding can be tested further by
searching for priors of any form which might upset it. If these are hard to find,
or unreasonable on other grounds, it should be acceptable, even to those
who would not normally take a Bayesian approach, that the conclusion
reached is not "sublecrfve" or personal in the sense that it holds only for a
narrow subclass of possible priors.
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Since by Bayes' theorem p(8 I X) ex: p(8) p(X I 8), the starting point when looking
for priors which might make the difference between posteriors defined in (3)
more than negligibly greater than zero is to compare the likelihood functions,
p(X 18) = exp[-n(8-X)2/2cr2],

of the two results. These are plotted in Figure 3.

Figure 3 about here

An informal approach to maximizing (3) is to distribute p(8) jointly between
values of 8 within Ho (Le., 8E [-75,75]) for which the likelihood of the n=30 result is
higher than that of the n=90 result.' and 8 values outside Ho where the opposite
is true. As shown in Figure 3, the likelihood functions intersect at 8=30,442 and
8=75.091, which means that p(8) must be concentrated on the sub-null interval
-75$8<30.442, or better still on 8 within this interval for which the difference

between likelihoods is greatest (Le., around 8=1.49), and on the alternative 8
values

75<8~75.091.

There can be little or no prior mass on the intervening 8

values (Le., on the remainder of the null interval,

30.442<8~75)

because in this

interval the n=90 likelihood is much the larger. Similarly, p(8) cannot be large
for alternative 8 values other than those in the extremely narrow interval
between 75 and 75.09', since outside this tiny segment of H, the n=30
likelihood is the higher of the two.
Note that prior distributions with only one of the two suggested modes or
points of concentration will not lead to (3) being appreciably greater than
zero. In particular, with priors massed only within

-75~8<30.442,

both posteriors

will be approximately one. This has been seen already with the prior N(-5.04,
51 .602) which maximizes (3) for normal priors, the posteriors here both being

greater than .99. Similarly, for priors which are essentially spikes in

75<8~75.091,
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both posteriors will be zero or approximately zero. For example, assuming the
prior distribution 8 - N(75.0455, .032) , which gives p(Ho)=.0647, the respective
posteriors are .0651 (n=90) and .0649 (n=30).
These considerations reveal that to make the difference between posterior
probabilities represented by (3) more than negligibly greater than zero, peS)
must be bi-modal with a spike or sharp peak in the tiny interval

75<8~75.091.

A

prior of this form is hardly likely to be considered reasonable - indeed any
inference hinged on such a prior could not be taken seriously." Here we have
used the Bayesian device of excluding some particular inference on the basis
that the prior required to come to such a conclusion is unsustainable.

Any

inference which is not explicitly Bayesian is liable to be "found out" with this
form of hypothetico-deductive refutation.

7.

No Possible Reconciliation

An auditee obliged to alter a stated balance when the evidence supporting
that balance is strong - i.e., when p(Ho I X) is high over a wide class of priors might attribute this imposition
conservativism.

to

the

auditor's innate and justifiable

The perception of the auditor as one who requires almost

deductive (100%) confirmation of Ho before accepting the auditee's balance
is appealing, yet cannot be sustained once an instance of Ho being accepted
when indeed its posterior probability is not high (for at least a subclass of
reasonable priors) is seen to occur.
A possible orthodox defence of such apparently inconsistent behavior by the
auditor is that the acceptance of Ho when p(Ho I X) is relatively low might be
explained by a difference in error costs between that test and any larger test
in which Ho is rejected when p(Ho I X J is relatively high. That is, there might
possibly be a reconciliation between the two results once error costs are
considered, particularly since one test uses smaller n than the other, this in itself
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suggesting a lesser error cost for one or other error type (or both), in the test
with lesser n.
To examine this possibility, compare again the tests with sample sizes n=30
and n=90 discussed above. The power functions, p(Reject Ho I a, n), of these
two tests are shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4 about here

Both tests are "negative" in that each has preset minimum power against

I a I »tn of 97.5% (ct. Duke et al. (1982) p.51). The power functions of the tests
over I a I »tn are practically equal, both tests giving very high priority to errors
of type II (incorrect acceptance of Ho)' Clearly, however, the smaller (n=30)
test has a higher probability of rejecting Ho when I a I ~ m; i.e.. a higher
probability of type I ("alpha") error (incorrect rejection of Ho).
The underlying difference between the two tests implied by this comparison is
that in the test with smaller n there is less cost associated with incorrectly
rejecting Ho (the auditee's balance); errors of this type can therefore be
tolerated more frequently.

But this difference does not explain why Ho is

accepted in the smaller test with, for priors such as (v)-(viii), relatively low
posterior probability, for if anything, a lower cost of incorrectly rejecting Ho
would suggest, ceteris paribus, that Ho might have relatively high probability,
rather than low probability, before being accepted.'
It appears, therefore, that the decisions compared, despite both being "by
the book" from the classical viewpoint do not have a consistent evidential
basis.

Rather, one hypothesis with either practically the same or smaller

probability than another (depending on the prior) is accepted when the other,
better supported, hypothesis is rejected, the only difference between the two

I

I
I

L
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tests being that the cost of a false rejection of the hypothesis tested is higher in
the test where that hypothesis is rejected than in the one where lt is not.
Bayesians refer to such logical inconsistencies as "incoherence" and regard
statistical coherence, or mutually consistent decisions and inferences, as the
hallmark of rationality and the fundamental objective of mathematical
reasoning (Lindley (1972) pp.3-1 0).

8.

Possible Cross-Subsidies

Having observed a marginal rejection of Ho in circumstances where p(Ho I X J is
"objectively" (independent-of-prior), or at least arguably, high, the auditor is
left in an invidious position. Other evidence aside, she must either comply with
her predesignated decision rule, reject Ho, and proceed to negotiation and
perhaps further sampling, thus adding to the cost of the audit. or she can rely
on a Bayesian interpretation, introducing prior beliefs formally into the analysis,
and infer that the auditee's balance is acceptable. Either way she might be
criticised.

If she holds to conventional practice and rejects the stated

balance, it could be argued that she has inflexibly and illogically overserviced
the client, thereby giving rise to unnecessary costs, including perhaps those
associated with lowering the auditee's reported net income.

On the other

hand, if she fails to act on a marginal rejection in qualitatively the same way as
on a more extreme rejection in which the observed X is much outside [-m,m],
she will have introduced an element of personal discretion or subjectivity and
cast aside the mathematical surety of specified error frequencies over the
long-run.

From this frequentist point of view, she is obliged to overlook

considerations which appear relevant (subjectively) within the circumstances
and requirements of a particular single test. so as to ensure (mathematically)
good results on average over many tests. Note here the follOWing remarks of
Beck et al. (1990) pp.173-4:
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While such ex post-to-sampling modifications are permissible (even necessary)
within a Bayesian framework, we recognize that they can be viewed as
fundamentally inconsistent with classical hypothesis testing.
Under classical
hypothesis testing, the decision maker (auditor) precommits to reject the null
hypothesis under specified conditions. Provided that the underlying assumptions
are satisfied, precommitment enables the decision maker (auditor) to control
statistically the frequency of inferential errors [incorrect decisions] associated with
the sampling/estimation process. (square brackets mine)

If she abides strictly by her predesignated decision rule, an auditor can
defend her behavior (decision) in a particular single test by appeal to the
theoretical error frequencies of that rule of "inductive behavior" (Neyman's
term) over a long run of different tests and different audits and auditees.
Taking such an approach, all individual tests in a sequence of such tests
conducted by a given auditor (or firm) are equally defensible, but by being
treated as merely one of a sequence, those tests in which rejection of Ho is
only marginal give rise to costs higher than might have been, had such tests
been treated severally (i.e., without reference to any other test, or to any
envisaged sequence of tests). This implies a form of cross-subsidy, some clients
bearing higher than necessary costs so as to allow the auditor to instantiate
strict compliance with a forestated decision rule, thereby cementing the
theoretical defence of her similarly mechanistic, precommited practice in the
cases of other clients, past and future.

9.

Confidence Intervals Rather Than Hypothesis Tests

By attributing any rejection of Ho, marginal or otherwise, the same qualitative
meaning regardless of the sample size and other evldentlollv relevant factors,
users of classical hypothesis tests make decisions without a consistent rational
basis. To avoid such incoherent behavior, it would help if decisions were
based on confidence measures rather than hypothesis tests. Consider, for
example, the orthodox 1OO(l-~)% confidence interval for

e,

assuming the

model X-N(e, (J2), that is X ±z~/2(JNn. This interval is also the Bayesian maximum
density credible interval for

e,

provided either (a) the prior is at least locally
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unlntorrnctlve." or (b) n is large enough that the prior is in effect uninformative.
Under these circumstances, it can be held legitimately that the probability that
S lies in

[X-z~l2crNn, X+z~/zO"Nn]

straightforward

and

is approximately 1-p.

From here, it is a

natural mathematical extension to calculate

the

probability, or level of inductive confidence, applying to the null lntervol
Ho: SE [-m,m].

The mathematical correspondence between

orthodox and

Bayesian

confidence measures for sufficiently large n. or where the prior assumed is
suitably uninformative, affords orthodox results quasi-Bayesian status.

By

observlnq the confidence coefficient applying to the S-inteNal Ho: SE [-m,m],
rather than merely whether Ho is formally "accepted" or "rejected" at a
sometimes quite arbitrary "crltlcol" level, the auditor is able to make a judicial
(evidence-based) rather than mechanical (rule-based) decision to either
accept or reject the auditee's stated balance. Also, there is the possibility of
incorporating other, perhaps extra-statistical, considerations into the decision
process, as is normally imperative.
This argument is consistent with remarks of Loebbecke and Neter (1975,
pp.39-40) on the respective uses in practical situations of hypothesis tests and
confidence intervol estimates:
While there is generally a direct connection between the testing and [confidence
interval] estimation approaches, the important distinction is in their uses. When a
testing approach is utilized, a decision is made on the basis of a particular sample
result. With the estimation approach, on the other hand, information about the
magnitude of the characteristic of interest is obtained without leading directly to a
decision. A decision may, indeed, be made after a number of characteristics have
been estimated or after additional nonquantitative information has been considered;
however, a decision is not made on the basis of one sample result alone. (square
brakets mine)

These comments appear to support an approach based on an inductive or
inferential interpretation of confidence mtervols. as opposed to the strictly

decision-theoretic approach of classical hypothesis testing, according to

d
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which each point X in the sample space translates without any possible
subjective interpretation into a decision (action) - either the null hypothesis is
rejected or accepted, not on any consideration of the strength of evidence,
but simply according to whether that value of X falls on one side or the other
of a predesignated partition or "crltlcol" value, here denoted by Xc'
An intrinsic logical strength of confidence intervals over hypothesis tests is that
as the sample size increases, or as sampling variation decreases (perhaps
through better experimental design; e.g., stratification) confidence intervals
tend to become "more Bayesian" and hypothesis tests "less Bayesian". In an
auditing context the divergence, as n increases, between the results of
orthodox hypothesis tests and Bayesian inference is apparent in the Lindley-like
paradox seen above (Section 4). On the other hand, because orthodox and
Bayesian confidence levels tend to converge as n increases, the prior
becoming relatively less and less informative, orthodox confidence intervals
have more general relevance as the sample size becomes larger. Specifically,
levels of confidence take on the meaning which users commonly give and
require of them - that is, they become broadly interpretable as measures of
inductive probability, or degrees of certainty, applying to the proposition that
lies within the stated interval.

e

This type of probability statement is strictly

inadmissible within the strictures of orthodox (Neyman-Pearson) statistics (Arens
and Loebbecke (1981) p.llS), but is sanctioned by Bayesian theory, for a
broader and broader spectrum of priors as n increases.

10. Conclusion
The evidential assessment of classical levels of significance levels is highly
problernotlc." and requires consideration of factors not conventionally
considered relevant ex post (i.e., after the test has been run), including
particularly the sample size

n. In general, data of a fixed significance level

(say S%) provide evidence more and more in favor of Ho the larger n (although
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without explicit Bayesian calculations a precise measure of support cannot be
stated).

Put another way, the posterior probability of Ho given data Xc

marginally significant at a given "crltlcol" level, p(Ho I XJ, tends to increase with

n, and in the auditors 'neqotlve" test structure, is shown to approach one,
whatever the prior. As a consequence, orthodox conclusions based on results
about Xc are generally internally inconsistent across tests of different sample
sizes.

Specifically, a result of about Xc with large n. marginally rejecting Ho'

provides practically the same or greater evidence in favor of Ho (depending
on the prior) than a smaller sample result, also about Xc but marginally
accepting that hypothesis.

Hence the suggestion above of statistical or

evldentlol vlncoherence''.

The practical consequences of such logical inconsistencies in conventional
statistical decision making in auditing include possible cross-subsidies, where in
commiting to the Neyman-Pearson, frequentist protocol, and its justification in
terms of long-run average error frequencies, marginal rejection of a particular
auditee's stated balance gives rise to costs which would not have been
incurred had the same test result been viewed from a Bayesian (single-case)
rather than

classical (long-run

average) standpoint.

To avoid

such

unwarranted costs, it would help if auditors were made aware of the
evidential relevance of the sample size from both ex ante and ex post
perspectives.

Pre-test (ex ante), the larger n the better, more information

always being preferred to less (apart from the costs of sampling), irrespective
of whether the logic employed is classical or Bayesian. However, post-test (ex
posf), marginal rejection of Ho with larger n, rather than representing more
reliable or stronger evidence against Ho' tends to more support that
hypothesis. This is contrary to popular intuition (cf. Nelson et al. (1986) p.130l).
Unfortunately, it is usually the case that orthodox textbooks, excepting those
cited in Section 4, make no comment on the ex post relevance, or otherwise,
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of n. Because of this perhaps, there is quite a common view that the sample
size is irrelevant ex
obliged to

post. II This view holds only if users of hypothesis tests are

maintain a strictly aevidential,

frequentist-decision-theoretic

(mechanistic) interpretation of tests, as promulgated by Neyman and Pearson,
although subsequently, it is argued (Johnstone (1987)), recanted by both.
Following standard statistical textbooks, most expositions of hypothesis testing
in auditing are ostensibly frequentist-decision-theoretic in philosophy, but
difficulties arise when the results of such tests have to be aggregated with
other (evidential) considerations so as to allow a broadly-based and
defensible decision.

Under obligation to provide a meaningful in-the-single-

case (to client's, courts etc.) interpretation of orthodox results, even the most
technically careful theorists occasionally lapse into an evidential, and
therefore technically heretical, statement of results. For example, Arens and
Loebbecke (1981, pp.133-34), having at first denied the legitimacy of any such
interpretation (see above), make the strictly improper (or, alternatively,
Bayesian) statement that the confidence coefficient attached to an orthodox
confidence interval is the probability that the parameter estimated lies within
that interval:
The concept of the confidence level is the same for variables sampling as it is for
attributes. It is a statement of the probability that the true population error value
actually falls within the limits of the confidence interval.

This is an intuitive but unwarranted response to the question raised by Neyman
(see Section 3) of why users might justifiably decide to act on the presumption
that the unknown parameter lies within the estimated interval.

Similarly,

Loebbecke and Neter (1975, p.40) fall into an apparently inductivist, contrafrequentist interpretation of a test result as substantiating or confirming a stated
account balance:
When an auditor is examining an account bv means of a single ouoitlnq
procedure and the audit objective is to substantiate the correctness of the
account balance, the testing approach may be the appropriate one. (my italics)
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Neyman (e.g., 1950, pp.259-60) specifically disallows any intuitive, inferential
understanding of the terms "accept" and "reject". On his strict, but received."
frequentist view, the result of a hypothesis test is merely an automated
decision to act either as if Ho were true (e.g., to accept the clients balance) or
as if HI were true (Neyman (1976) pp.750-l). This action is taken not on the
basis of the "evidence" in any sense, but because a predesignated decision
rule (hypothesis test), with inbuilt low error frequencies, says to do so:
Neyman-Pearson tests are presented as a kind of recipe ... One simply fixes the size
a of a test, finds the the most powerful test having a given size and then accepts or
rejects. If asked why anyone should find it desirable to do this the rationale given
by Neyman is this: If one 'behaves' in this way one will incorrectly reject ho not more
than 1DOa percent of the time and incorrectly accept h o not more than 1DO~
percent of the time, (for a, ~ the probabilities of type I and type II errors
respectively). (Mayo (1981) P .196)
To emphasise the theoretical difference between their program and the Bayesian
one, Neyman-Pearson relied on the ordinary language meaning of such terms as
behavior (in the technical term 'inductive behavior'). as opposed to inference,
and the characterization of their program as fundamentally 'decision theoretic. I
(Seidenfeld (1979) pp. 1L1-5)

To some, Neyman's injunction against an inferential or cognitive interpretation
of test results appears philosophically pedantic and overly "theoretical", but in
fact his position is justified, indeed necessitated, by the logical deficiencies of
classical methods when interpreted as methods of inference (rather than as
mere decision rules), including, as discussed in this paper, their inherent
evidential incoherence. Detailed support for this dismissal of Neyman-Pearson
theory as a normative framework for inference (belief revision) in auditing, is
provided in Johnstone (1994).
Auditing is commonly regarded as an inductive, evidential or judicial process
(e.g., Arens and Loebbecke (1991) p.2), thus raising the issue of whether the
application of statistical procedures which, on the express admissions of their
proponents, are without evidential content, can be justified.

Adding to this

infirmity, the argument provided herein reveals that observed results close
about the "crltlcol'' accept/reject partition in conventional hypothesis tests can
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often result in reversed decisions (actions) when the auditor takes an evidential
(here meaning Bayesian) perspective, rather than the classical frequentistdecision-theoretic view.

Because practical audit decisions are bound to be

affected, the logical and philosophical foundations of classical hypothesis
tests in auditing should be re-evaluated.

If it is found, as suggested above,

that there is a fundamental incompatibility between conclusions of the genre
offered by this paradigm and those which auditors require, the apparent
tendency of both theorists and practitioners to interpret hypothesis tests and
confidence intervals in ways specifically disallowed by orthodox statistical texts
will be better understood, and to some extent, vindicated.

11. Postscript: A Further Example

In comments on this paper, Aldersley (1994) replicated the calculations of
Section 5 in the case of another test, more common in auditing practice. The
test considered is that in attribute sampling of the population proportion p.
where the number of errors, k, observed in a sample of size

n has a binomial

distribution with parameter p (Ospsl) and index n. The auditor tests the null
hypothesis

against its alternative (complement)

H1: p>m,
where m=O.15 (say) is the level at which the relative frequency of errors in the
population is deemed material. Two possible test results are considered:
(n:::30, k= 1)

UCL = .149

(n=!OO, k=9)

UCL = .152.

The classical decision rule (Arens and Loebbecke (1981) pp.78-9) is to reject Ho
if and only if the (one-sided) upper confidence limit [UCL] for p exceeds
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m=0.15. On this rule, Ho is accepted in the n=30 test and rejected in the n= 100

test. It is found however that the Bayesian posterior probability of Ho is as high
or higher on the n= 100 rejection as for the n=30 acceptance, again contraindicating the classical results.

Note that the decision rule described

constitutes a "neqotlve" test, since its effect is to fix the power function with
respect to p=m.

(The power of the test against other possible values of p

depends on the sample size, n.)

The Bayesian calculations are as follows. Assuming a beta (conjugate) prior
with parameters a and b (a.b» 0), the posterior distribution of p is also beta,
with parameters o+k and b-r-k. k denoting the number of errors observed in n
trials (DeGroot (1986) pp.321-2). The posterior probability of Ho is given then by
the normalized incomplete beta function

{r(a+b+n) / [r(o+k) r(b+n-k)]}

f~5a+k-l (l-p)b+n-k-l

dp.

(4)

o

Letting each of the prior parameters a and b take any value between 0 and
50, thus allowing for the broadest possible class of prior distributions, the
posterior probability of Ho is found from (4) for each of the two sample
observations supposed above. The difference between these posteriors

p(Ho I k= 1, n=30) - p(Ho I k=9, n= 100),

defined as a function of the prior parameters a and b. is plotted in Figure 5. It
is seen from this figure that as in the test of the normal mean, the large sample
rejection of Ho leaves that hypothesis with at least the same posterior
probability as does the smaller sample rejection, regardless of the values
chosen for

a and b. Furthermore, by the same argument as discussed above

in the case of the test of the normal mean, it is not possible to reconcile these
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apparently anomalous results through consideration of the two tests' implicitly different error costs.

Figure 5 about here

12. Appendix
Figure 6 is a graphical representation of the prior distributions numbered (i), (ii),
(v) and (vi) in Section 4 above.

Figure 6 about here

To illustrate the results of Bayesian analysis, Figure 7 shows the posterior
distribution corresponding to each of the four numbered priors, assuming the
possible observation (n=90, X =39.8776).

Figure 7 about here

It can be seen by compcring Figures 6 and 7 that although the four priors
represented are greatly different, the resulting posteriors are not much
different. Such comparison of posterior distributions should be regarded as a
method of sensitivity analysis, through which the auditor can assess the weight
of sample evidence by noting the extent to which the conclusion or decision
prompted by that evidence depends on the assumed prior.

In cases of

sufficiently informative data, the prior is practically irrelevant. Conversely, if the
prior chosen makes a great difference, the data have relatively little
information content.
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Footnotes

1. By adding an arbitrarily small number 0 to X =X c : the resulting confidence
interval, (X c+o)±z~/2crNn, would lie partly outside [-m,m] and hence Ho
would be rejected unambiguously. However, the results which follow,
including particularly Bayesian posterior probabilities, would be
unchanged to any required number of decimal places. For this reason,
we can think of Xc as practically X c+o, and hence of X c+z~/2crNn as
marginally greater than tn: therefore rejecting Ho.
2. An 'uniuckv" random sample might include only or mostly very small
accounts, or accounts which have not been transacted for a long period,
therefore probably misrepresentating the broader population.
A
commonly overlooked advantage of stratification is that, with selection of
appropriate strata, such samples cannot occur, and hence not only is
there generally a reduction in sampling variation, and hence an increase
in power, but also the practitioner goes some way towards avoiding what
logicians (e.g., Seidenfeld (1979) pp.15, 55) have called "p roblems of the
backward look": see Johnstone (1988; 1989) for further explanation and
references.
3. Note that the largest of the particular results considered has n of only 90.
This test has minimum type I (less important) error probability, 13(8=0)=.026,
greater than its maximum type II (more important) error probability,
13( I 8 I =m)=.025, hence satisfying the error probability priority requirement
discussed above (the complete power function, 1-13(8), of this test is shown
in Figure 4).
4. The Lindley paradox requires increasing n: but the limit of p(Ho I Xc) == 1-13/2
found in this paper holds for uniform priors whatever the value of n, and
depends on increasing n only in that it then becomes "objective", or, in
other words, independent of the chosen prior (cf. Johnstone (1993».
5. That is, p(X =14.1 18, n=30) > p(X =39.877618, n=90).
6. The adage that it is hard to tell good fish but easy to tell bad fish applies
also to prior probability distributions.
Interestingly, although of little
practical relevance, the prior which maximizes (3) is that with two spikes:
PC8= 1.49)=p(Ho)=·324 and p(8=75+o)=p(H j ) =.676.

This leads to p(Ho I X)
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equal to .752 (n=30) and .248 (n=90), and hence (3) equals .504. Use of
such a prior entails a test of two point hypotheses. Also of "theoretical"
interest only, the minimum value of (3) is -,997, arising with 1.1= -19436 and
v=316.819. Equally large negative differences arise for large positive 1.1.
7. What else implied by the power functions could rationalize the auditor's
decisions? In the smaller test p(Ho) might be relatively low, in which case a
relatively high probability of type I error could be allowed. But a low prior
on Ho would reduce rather than increase p(Ho I X), thus not reconciling the
two results. Or, looking at the larger test, its low type I error probability
might be explained by a high prior p(Ho), which would increase its p(Ho I X),
therefore similarly accentuating the apparent inconsistency.
8. A prior is called "locally uninformative" or "locally uniform" if it is both
(a) fairly flat in the s-lntervol where the likelihood function is high, and (b)
not large outside this lntervol (Box and Tiao (1973) p.23). Edwards et ol.
(1963, p.201) discuss reliance on such priors under the heading "Stable
Estimation",
9. The following comments of Edwards et ol, based in part on Lindley's finding
(i.e., that for a point null hypothesis with non-zero prior probability, marginal
rejection at any given significance level, no matter how small, tends to
support that hypothesis strongly as n becomes sufficiently large) applies
equally to the hypothesis tests used in auditing: "",evidence that leads to
classical rejection of the null hypothesis will often leave a Bayesian more confident of that
same null hypothesis than he was to start with."

(Edwards et a!. (1963) p.240)

10. In papers by Berger and Sellke (1987, pp.135-6) and Berger and
Delampady (1987, pp.317-8), this difficulty is discussed as one of
"calibration". The problem in these terms is to calibrate the statistical
significance scale onto an evidence scale, or, in other words, to transform
significance levels into measures of evidence. This transformation involves
n, but other factors are relevant also, particularly the population variance
cr2, and, as revealed by Casella and Berger (1987a), the broad class of
procedure in question (e.q. whether Ho is a point, or interval such as 8~m.).
The general conclusion of the Berger et al. studies is that evidential
calibration of significance levels presents such difficulties that even with
the intuition developed with experience users cannot easily "learn to
interpret" these conventional measures in terms of evidence. On the
assumption that an evidential interpretation of tests is that which most users
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require, Berger and Sellke (p.136) conclude in regard to statistical
significance tests that lithe future of the concept statistics is highly
questionable".
11. Many users of statistical tests believe that because the sample size is taken
into account in the "standardization" of the observed sample result - e.g., in
the calculation of z(X)=(X-8o)..Jn/ cr - the resultant decision to either
"accept" or "reject" Ho has meaning independent of that subsumed n.
12. Kempthorne (1976, p. 765) contends that virtually all statistical texts adopt
Neyman's mathematical and philosophical framework. Also recognizing
Neyman's profound influence on the theory and practice of statistics, his
colleagues Lecam and Lehmann (1974, p.vii) make the following
comments: "Neyman's publications span a period of fifty years. His early work has
become so thoroughly part of the common statistical consciousness that it is now only
rarely referenced and is no longer conceived as an individual contribution."

...
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Table 1
Posterior Probabilities Given Marginal Rejection of Ho

Assumed Sample Result

n=20,

-

n=50,

n=90,

Prior

p(Hn)

(i)

N(O, 1002 )

·547

·965

·981

·980

(ii)

N(O, 5000 2)

·012

·951

·975

·975

(iii)

N( 1()4, 50002)

·002

-951

·974

·975

(iv)

N(- 1()4, 5000 2)

·002

-952

·974

·975

(v)

N(90, 152 )

·159

·417

.575

·688

(vi)

N(120, 25 2)

·036

·335

.566

·707

(vii)

N(-90, 152)

·159

·420

.922

1·000

(viii)

N(-120, 25 2)

·036

·339

.967

1·000

X=·4942

-

X=27.8784

-

X=39·8776

Table 2
Comparison of Posterior Probabilities of H
o

Assumed Result

Prior

(i)
(ii)

(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)

n=30

p(Hn)

-

X=14·1

n=90

-

X=39·8776

AcceptHn

RejectHn

·547

·980

-980

·012

·973

·975

N(l CJ4, 5000 2)

{)()2

-972

·975

N(- 1CJ4, 5000 2)

·002

·974

·975

N(90, 152)

·159

·482

·688

N(120,25 2 )

·036

'433

·707

N(-90,15 2)

·159

'636

1{lOO

N(-120, 25 2)

·036

·654

1·000

N(O, 1002 )
N(0,5OOC)2)

L

200

Figure 1
Surface Plot of Difference Between Posteriors

p(HolX=14.1, n=30) - p(HolX=Xc=39.8776, n=90)
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